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Helling v. McKinney 
VALID EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
CLAIM STATED WHERE 
PRISONER ALLEGED COM-
PELLED EXPOSURE TO 
DANGEROUS LEVELS OF 
,SECONDARY SMOKE 
CREATED AN 
UNREASONABLE RISK OF 
HARM TO HIS FUTURE 
HEALTH. 
In a 7 -2 decision, the United States 
Supreme Court in Helling v. 
McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993), 
held that aNevada state prisoner stated 
an actionable Eighth Amendment 
claim of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, wherein he contended that prison 
officials involuntarily exposed him to 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke 
("ETS") levels, endangering his fu-
ture health. In so holding, Justice 
Byron R. White, writing for the ma-
jority, opined that an inmate is en-
titled to injunctive relief when he es-
tablishes that he is subjected to unsafe 
or inhumane conditions, which are 
threatening to his health and adverse 
to contemporary standards of decency, 
as a result of the deliberate indiffer-
ence of prison officials. 
While completing his term of im-
prisonment in the Nevada State Prison, 
Carson City, Nevada, William 
McKinney was confined in a cell with 
a fellow prisoner who smoked ap-
proximately five packs of cigarettes 
per day. McKinney claimed that he 
suffered from deteriorating health due 
to inhalation of secondary smoke, and 
that his health was further jeopar-
dized by continued confinement with 
a heavy smoker. McKinney further 
contended that no warnings were given 
to inmates upon the sale and distribu-
tion of cigarettes concerning the po-
tential health risks posed by ETS, and 
at that time, the director of the Nevada 
state prison system had not yet adopted 
a policy prohibiting smoking in re-
stricted areas. Although McKinney 
had been transferred to Ely State 
Prison, where he was no longer housed 
with a five-pack-a-day smoker, he 
still faced the possibility of being 
returned to Carson City. 
On December 18, 1986, McKinney 
filed a pro se civil rights suit in the 
United States District Court, seeking 
injunctive relief and damages for vio-
lations of his Eighth Amendment 
rights. McKinney named as defen-
dants the director of the prison, the 
warden, the associate warden, a unit 
counselor and the manager of the 
prison store. He alleged that he was 
subjected to cruel and unusual pun-
ishment as a result of the health threat 
created by ETS. At the jury trial, a 
federal magistrate granted the prison 
officials' motion for a directed verdict 
on the grounds that McKinney did not 
have a constitutional right to be incar-
cerated in a smoke-free environment, 
and that McKinney failed to produce 
evidence demonstrating the deliberate 
indifference of the prison officials to 
his immediate health needs. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
findings that McKinney was not con-
stitutionally entitled to confinement 
in an environment free of ETS and 
that no evidence existed in the 'record 
indicating the deliberate indifference 
of prison officials to any medical prob-
lems McKinney may have suffered. 
The court further granted the prison 
officials immunity from liability dam-
ages, because a law providing for 
such damages was not in existence in 
Nevada. The court, however, held 
that McKinney had stated a valid 
Eighth Amendment claim by alleging 
future harm to his health as a result of 
compelled exposure to dangerous lev-
els ofETS. 
The United States Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of the court of 
appeals in light of its recent decision 
in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.-, 
III S.Ct. 2321 (1991). The Court 
held that Seiter added a subjective 
element to Eighth Amendment claims, 
where the deliberate indifference of 
the prison officials is taken into con-
sideration, and therefore remanded 
the case to the court of appeals for 
further proceedings consistent with 
its opinion. Upon remand and in 
accord with the higher court's order, 
the court of appeals reinstated its 
prior judgment and remanded the case 
to the trial court for findings pursuant 
to its opinion and Seiter. The United 
States Supreme Court granted the 
prison officials' petition for certiorari 
and affirmed the jUdgment of the court 
of appeals. 
The Court began its analysis by 
addressing the issues brought by the 
prison officials in their petition for 
certiorari: (l) that in his complaint, 
McKinney only alleged that he suf-
fered from present maladies as a re-
sult of ETS exposure and not future 
health problems, and that the lower 
court erred in deciding it sua sponte; 
and (2) that the court of appeals erred 
in finding that McKinney had stated a 
valid Eighth Amendment cause of 
action, wherein he claimed ETS ex-
posure threatened his future health. 
Helling, 113 S.Ct. at2479. The Court 
disposed ofthe first issue by deferring 
to the court of appeals' reading of the 
record upon intermediate appellate 
review, and then focussed its analysis 
upon the second issue.Id. The Court 
found that the court of appeals did not 
err in finding that McKinney stated an 
Eighth Amendment claim upon which 
relief could be granted. 
The Court then proceeded to in-
terpret the Eighth Amendment and 
what constitutes a violation thereof. 
The Court stated: 
... When the State by the affir-
mative exercise of its power so 
restrains an individual's liberty that 
it renders him unable to care for 
himself, and at the same time fails 
to provide for his basic human 
needs - e.g., food, clothing, shel-
ter, medical care, and 
reasonable safety - it transgresses 
the substantive limits on state 
action set by the Eighth Amend-
ment. .. 
Id. at 2480 (quoting DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep 't of Social 
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 
(1989». By failing to provide for 
"basic human needs," such action 
invariably violates contemporary stan-
dards of decency.ld. at 2480 (citing 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,103-
04 (1976». The Court stressed, how-
ever, that negligent deprivation of 
medical assistance to inmates does 
not rise to the level of an Eighth 
Amendment violation. ld. at 2480. In 
order to amount to an Eighth Amend-
ment violation, prison officials must 
act with "deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners." 
ld. at 2480 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. 
at 104). Seiter clarified the deliberate 
indifference standard by adding a sub-
jective component into the Eighth 
Amendment inquiry, and thereby 
mandating an exploration into the 
mind set of prison officials. 
The Court rejected the prison of-
ficials' claim that an Eighth Amend-
ment violation is based solely upon 
the deliberate indifference to present 
or ongoing health problems suffered 
by McKinney, which resulted from 
exposure to toxic levels ofETS. Id. 
at 2480. The Court explicitly stated 
that the notion "[t]hat the Eighth 
Amendment protects against future 
harm to inmates is not a novel propo-
sition." ld. The Court cited Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678,682 (1978), in 
support of its assertion that inmates 
were entitled to Eighth Amendment 
injunctive reliefwhen they were over-
crowded in cells with others who suf-
fered from contagious diseases. ld. 
In Hutto, the conditions of confine-
ment required an Eighth Amendment 
remedy, even though none of the pris-
oners had suffered harm, due to the 
impending nature of the potential in-
JUry. 
The Court observed that the court 
of appeals had taken a similar ap-
proach to Eighth Amendment issues. 
For instance, in Gates v. Collier, 501 
F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) and in 
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (lOth 
Cir. 1980), the court of appeals 
granted relief under the Eighth 
Amendment for possible future harm, 
emphasizing that an inmate need not 
suffer a tragedy before action will be 
taken. In Gates, inmates were af-
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forded relief upon demonstrating un-
safe and life-threatening confinement 
conditions occasioned by exposed 
electrical wiring, insufficient safe-
guards against fire, and failure to 
isolate inmates with infectious dis-
ease from the rest of the prison popu-
lation. In Ramos, a prisoner, whose 
physical safety was endangered by 
threats of assault, was awarded Eighth 
Amendment relief prior to any physi-
cal injury. 
The Court further rejected the ar-
gument of the United States in its 
amicus curiae brief, wherein it sup-
ported the position of the prison offi-
cials. While the Government con-
ceded that certain conditions of con-
finement that "present a risk of suffi-
cient magnitude" to future health may 
constitute an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation, it contended, however, that the 
effects of exposure to secondary 
smoke on an individual is tenuous and 
that such exposure does not deviate 
from any societal standard of decency. 
ld. at 2481. The Court refused to 
reverse the court of appeals on these 
grounds alone, stating that such a 
reversal would be "premature." ld. 
In affirming the intermediate ap-
pellatecourt, the Supreme Courtenu-
me rated the necessary objective and 
subjective elements of a valid Eighth 
Amendment claim for cruel and un-
usual punishment.ld. To satisfy the 
objective prong, McKinney must es-
tablish, through the use of scientific 
and statistical evidence, that he was 
subjected to unreasonably dangerous 
levels ofETS.ld. at 2482. The Court 
pointed out that the district court 
should consider the fact that 
McKinney was transferred to another 
prison, that he was no longer housed 
in a cell with a heavy smoker, and that 
the director of the Nevada state prison 
system has adopted a smoking policy 
throughout the prison system.ld. Fur-
thermore, the objective factorrequires 
the court to assess, whether or not 
society considers such a health risk, 
as contrary to current standards of 
decency. Id. 
With respect to the subjective el-
ement, the deliberate indifference stan-
dard, McKinney must affirmatively 
prove that prison officials ignored the 
potential health risks of secondary 
smoke. Id. The Court stated that the 
district court should consider the cur-
rent attitudes and conduct of prison 
officials in order to evaluate their 
mind set when administering prison 
policies. Id. The Court pointed out 
that the district court should consider 
arguments concerning the realities of 
prison administration, as well as evalu-
ate any new administrative policies 
adopted by the prison system.Id. The 
Court noted that this factor would 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
RELIABILITY OF TESTI-
MONY RATHER THAN 
GENERAL ACCEPTANCE 
PROVIDES THE STANDARD 
FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
IN FEDERAL TRIALS. 
probably be mitigated in light of the 
new smoking policy instituted by the 
state prison system. Id. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia 
joined, disagreed with the majority's 
interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment, whereby "it applies to a 
prisoner's mere risk of injury." Id. 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Through a 
textual and historical approach, Jus-
tice Thomas failed to find any support 
for the majority's position "that dep-
rivations suffered by a prisoner con-
stitute 'punishmen[t]' for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, even when dep-
rivations have not been inflicted as 
part of a criminal sentence." Id. at 
2483. 
For seventy years, the dominant 
standard for determining the admissi-
bility of novel scientific evidence in 
federal trials has been the "general 
acceptance" test established in Frye 
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923). 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786(1993), 
the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, not the "general 
acceptance" test, govern a trial judge's 
determination of whether or not to 
admit scientific testimony into evi-
dence. In so ruling, the Court gave 
federal judges wider latitude to deter-
mine what scientific data should be 
admissible at trial. 
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller 
were born with serious birth defects. 
The minor boys and their parents 
brought an action in California state 
court alleging that the mothers' pre-
natal ingestion of Bendectin, a pre-
scription drug marketed by Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. caused 
the children's birth defects. Merrell 
The Helling opinion is significant 
in that prisoners may be afforded 
injunctive relieffor unsafe conditions 
of confinement prior to suffering any 
injury. The Court, however, cau-
tioned that such claims must meet 
both the subjective element of deliber-
ate indifference and the objective com-
ponent ofhazardous conditions which 
society deems intolerable. This is an 
expansive decision which widens the 
penumbra of prisoners' rights. Pris-
oners are now empowered with the 
means by which they may combat an 
indifferent prison administration, and 
obtain relief from inhumane treat-
ment and living conditions without 
needless suffering. 
-Amy Conrad 
Dow removed the case to federal court 
on diversity grounds. The United 
States District Court for the Southern 
District of California granted sum-
mary judgment to Merrell Dow based 
upon the affidavit of one reputable 
expert. In the affidavit, the expert 
concluded that maternal use of 
Bendectin had not been shown in any 
published journals to be a risk factor 
for causing human birth defects. 
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 279l. 
Applying the Frye test, the dis-
trict court concluded that contrary 
evidence presented by the plaintiffs 
was inadmissible. Despite the prof-
fered testimony of eight well-
credentialed experts that Bendectin 
can cause birth defects, the trial court 
found that such evidence was not 
"sufficiently established to have gen-
eral acceptance in the field in which it 
belongs." Daubert, at 2793 (quoting 
United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 
508,510 (9th Cir. 1978). CitingFrye 
for the rule that expert opinion of 
scientific data is inadmissible unless 
42 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.1 ___________________________ _ 
